This paper analyzes the evolution and the determinants of firm-level corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 to 2004 through a corporate governance practices index. A key contribution is to examine the totally voluntary adoption nature of corporate governance guidelines under an almost "no listing requirements" environment in Brazil over a reasonable time span while most studies use cross-section samples over one or a few years. This is probably one of the few papers to analyze the impact of ownership structure on the quality of corporate governance practices segregating control and cash flow rights. Overall firm-level corporate governance quality is slowly improving but is still poor. Voluntary adoption yields divergence rather than convergence, leading to greater heterogeneity of corporate governance quality.
Introduction
For the most part, the recent literature compares corporate governance mechanisms and standards among countries, trying to evaluate whether different levels of investor protection impacts ownership concentration or the adoption of better corporate governance practices. This approach, based on the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) , builds on the principle that the level of legal protection offered to external investors to prevent the expropriation of their wealth by managers and/or controlling shareholders is the key element to explain different corporate governance patterns across countries. Under this perspective, the firms' ownership structure and, consequently, their corporate governance model, can be seen as an equilibrium response to the legal environment where they operate. Other studies, such as La Porta et al. (2000) , Claessens et al. (2002) and Beck et al. (2001) provide additional analysis on the relation between finance and the level of investors' legal protection, suggesting that differences on the legal framework and on the enforcement of the law impact dividend policy, the availability of external finance, and firms' market value as well.
It's possible, however, that firms within the same country could show sharply different corporate governance standards and overall quality. Besides, differences between firms' corporate governance quality could be due to some of their observable characteristics. This idea is corroborated by Klapper & Love (2004) , who have noted a large degree of variation in the quality of corporate governance practices adopted by firms that are submitted to the same contractual environment, finding examples of firms with high corporate governance ratings in countries with weak investor protection and vice-versa. This approach was developed earlier by Himmelberg et al. (1999 Himmelberg et al. ( , 2001 ), who argue that the level of protection offered to investors has two components: an external one, related to the legal environment where the firm operates (legal protection), and an internal one, related to the type of activity carried out and to other observable firm characteristics (endogenous protection). In this sense, Himmelberg et al. (2001, p. 2) argue that "investor protection refers collectively to those features of the legal, institutional, and regulatory environment -and characteristics of firms or projects -that facilitate financial contracting between inside owners (managers) and outside investors". Under this point of view, therefore, it's possible that firms within a country offer different levels of protection to their investors, due to their operational specificities and to the different degrees of interest they could have to voluntarily adopt better corporate governance practices (since the potential gains from better governance would not be the same for all firms).
In this paper, we try to answer two broad questions: i) Have firms in Brazil voluntarily improved their corporate governance standards over time? ii) What motivates some firms in Brazil to voluntarily adopt better corporate governance, understood as the practices recommended by market agents through codes of best practices? Regarding the methodological approach, the papers of Anand et al. (2006) , Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) , and Silveira et al. (2004) are used as main references. Firstly, we examine the evolution of governance practices among Brazilian listed firms from 1998 to 2004, analyzing a broad corporate governance index and its four sub-indices (disclosure; board composition and functioning; ethics and conflicts of interest; and shareholder rights) throughout the period. Then we proceed to investigate the determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality among Brazilian listed companies, aiming to identify the firm characteristics associated with higher corporate governance ratings using panel data regression methods.
This line of research is important because the vast majority of academic papers on corporate governance have focused on evaluating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and practices on firm value. However, analyzing the evolution of firm level corporate governance quality and relating their voluntarily adopted practices to firms characteristics is also important, since it helps to understand what can lead firms to improve their governance practices in places where the level of corporate governance quality reflects decisions voluntarily taken by firms (or to be more specific in the Brazilian case, decisions mainly taken by the firms' controlling shareholders).
Our empirical results suggest that recent years have seen an increase in the overall level of corporate governance in Brazil, but at a sluggish pace, and that firm-level corporate governance quality in Brazil can still be considered unsatisfactory. Moreover, we didn't observe a convergence towards the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices. Rather, we observed an increasing divergence, leading to a higher heterogeneity of corporate governance quality among Brazilian firms. Additionally, this divergence is reflected in all governance dimensions (board of directors, disclosure, shareholder rights, and ethics)
Regarding the determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality, we confirm the hypotheses that growth perspectives, financial leverage, the issuance of Levels 2 or 3 ADRs and joining tone of Bovespa's premium listing segments (Level 2 or New Market) positively influence firm-level corporate governance quality. We also found that the type of controlling shareholder can be an important factor in the decision of the firm to voluntarily improve its governance practices. Specifically, we found that firms controlled by different and large blockholders associated through contractual arrangements have higher corporate governance quality, on average. On the other hand, we observed a negative relation between family controlled firms and corporate governance quality. We also observed that greater ownership concentration is negatively related to the voluntary adoption of governance practices.
Based on our results, the main contributions of this study are the following: 1) Our sample comprises a relatively long time period in which we can examine whether firms changed their governance standards in the absence of major legal requirements to do so (and in an almost "no listing requirements" environment); 2) The enactment of corporate governance landmarks in Brazil and abroad during this period, such as the reform of the Brazilian Corporation Law and the release of Bovespa's three special listing segments in 2000, the approval of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the issuance of CVM's 1 Recommendation on Corporate Governance in 2002, provides an opportunity to qualitatively evaluate if these events had a positive overall impact on the level of firms' compliance with better governance practices; 3) This is one of the few papers to analyze the impact of ownership structure on the quality of voluntarily adopted corporate governance practices, and it's probably the first one to analyze it segregating the impact of control rights from cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders; 4) The results indicate that a special ownership structure arrangement, called shared blockholding (firms with different and large blockholders associated through shareholder agreements) can positively influence the firm-level corporate governance quality. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to observe the influence of this type of controlling shareholding on the level of governance practices voluntarily adopted by firms.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the evolution of corporate governance regulation and self-regulation in place in Brazil throughout 1998 Brazil throughout -2004 ; section 3 presents an overview of the previous literature on this line of research; section 4 presents the research methodology, including the model and variable definitions; section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results; and section 6 concludes.
The Brazilian case: voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices
Some countries have adopted a "comply or explain" approach to improve their corporate governance practices (such as the UK and Germany). In such a system, although it is not mandatory that firms implement corporate governance guidelines, they must publicly disclose which practices they have implemented and explain the ones they elected not to enact. Brazil has taken a different approach with the totally voluntary adoption of good corporate governance practices. Firms do not have to adopt any governance practices besides, of course, what is legally required, and legal requirements are mild, concentrating on disclosure, directors duties, and a mandatory bid rule, to be quite general.
Nonetheless, several entities, the Brazilian securities commission (CVM), other regulators, the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), firms, associations interested in better corporate governance practices promotion, and institutional investors, have issued guidelines, recommendations, and codes of best practices. In fact, there has been a proliferation of such documents. Thus, one cannot say that the subject hasn't been addressed by salient organizations and that there hasn't been a structured discussion of the matter since the mid 90's.
For sake of brevity, we will mention only some of the most important initiatives that have been introduced or initiated during our sample period. Table 3 .
[insert Table 1 here]
Research Methodology

Theoretical and Operational Definition of Variables
Corporate governance quality
The proxy for corporate governance quality used in this paper was originally built by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) . The authors have created an index called "Corporate Governance
Practices Index" (CGI). The CGI is computed from the responses to twenty-four binary and objective questions, all of them assessed using publicly available secondary data. Each positive answer adds one point, so that the final score for each firm ranges from 0 to 24 (worst to best corporate governance quality). The index was built taking into account four dimensions deemed important by the literature to assess corporate governance quality: disclosure; board composition and functioning; ethics and conflicts of interest; and shareholder rights. We use an equally weighed version of the index because it is easier to reproduce. Also, although equally weighing all 24 questions entails a subjective evaluation, it has been argued in the literature that this procedure is probably less questionable than imposing more complex weighing schemes. The CGI questions are presented in Table 2 . Further information about the index construction (including the evidence supporting the inclusion of each question) can be found in Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) .
[insert Table 2 here]
Firms' market value
There are several operational definitions for this concept. We will use two alternative variables in our study:
Tobin's Q : estimated as the ratio of market value to book value of assets. Market value of assets is computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity at year-end. The numerator "market value of equity" was computed directly by the ECONOMATICA database as the price of the most liquid stock (voting or non-voting) times the total number of shares (voting and non-voting).
Market value of shares divided by their book value.
Other explanatory variables
Ownership structure variables (six alternative proxies):
-1VDIR and 3VDIR: defined as the percentage of common stock (voting capital) owned directly by the largest shareholder and the three largest shareholders, respectively 2 .
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-1TDIR and 3TDIR: defined as the percentage of total shares (voting and non voting capital) owned directly by the largest shareholder and the three largest shareholders, respectively.
-WEDGE1 and WEDGE3: defined as the ratio of voting capital to total capital owned directly by the largest shareholder and the three largest shareholders, respectively.
Future growth opportunities (GROWTH): proxied by the cumulative percentage variation of net revenues over the previous three years.
Type of operations (tangibility of assets -TANG): total fixed assets divided by net operational revenues. It is a proxy for the level of tangibility of the firm's operations.
Firm size (SIZE): natural logarithm of book value of total assets.
Profitability (two alternative proxies):
-ROA (Return on Assets): ratio of operating income to total assets at year-end.
-ROE (Return on Equity): ratio of net income to equity at year-end.
Issuance of ADRs (ADR23): binary variable that equals 1 (one) if the company trades ADRs These variables attribute 1 to companies that belong to a specific industry and 0 to companies from other industries. We adopted the classification criterion of the ECONOMATICA database (with twenty categories, three of which are not represented in our sample). All variables employed are summarized in Table 3 .
[insert Table 3 
Research model and methodological discussion
Based on the hypotheses described in Table 1 , we estimated the model below using the Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects panel data regression procedures. 
In Equation 1, i represents the firm and t the year (with 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 t = ). it ε is the random error term from the i-th firm in the t-th year. The term captures unobserved firm characteristics i u that do not vary over time. Based on the hypothesis summarized in Table 1 , we expect statistically significant coefficients with the following signs:
, , , , 0
-Since the direction of the relationship between firm size and firm-level corporate governance, and between ownership structure and firm-level corporate governance are ambiguous, we do not have an expected sign for the coefficients 3 β and 6 β ; -δ , γ and ϕ are coefficients related to several binary control variables.
Analysis of Results
Evolution of corporate governance practices in Brazil
The summary statistics of the corporate governance index (CGI) and its four sub-indices from 1998 to 2004 scaled to a 0-10 range are presented at Table 4 .
[insert Table 4 Besides CGI descriptive statistics, explanatory variables summary statistics are presented in Table 5 wherefrom we draw some comments on the evolution of relevant corporate attributes i) The percentage of voting stocks among all shares issued (VOTE variable) remains virtually unchanged throughout the period, with 55% of voting stocks for the average firm in 2004; j) Regarding the age of the firms, the sample was mostly comprised of mature firms, with an average and median of about 50 years of age. This is probably a result of the scarce IPO activity during the eighties and nineties in Brazil.
[insert Table 5 here]
Finally, a correlation matrix between the CGI, its sub-indices, and selected explanatory variables is shown in Table 6 . From the correlation matrix, we can highlight the more interesting and significant associations 6 :
1. According to our hypothesis, the CGI was positively correlated with the issuance of [insert Table 6 here]
Determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality
The results from Pooled OLS regressions of the CGI on its main potential determinants are presented in Table 7 . Each column corresponds to a distinct regression using alternative variables for ownership structure and firm value. For instance, column (1) represents an OLS regression using 1VDIR as an ownership variable and Tobin's Q as a performance variable.
[insert Table 7 here]
The results from OLS regressions should, however, be analyzed with caution, because this method does not account for unobserved firm characteristics that could hinder the correct relationship identification between firm-level corporate governance and its potential determinants. If some of these "omitted variables" impact corporate governance quality at the firm-level and are correlated with the regressors included in the model, then the estimated coefficients would be inconsistent, reflecting a spurious relationship between the variables of interest. In order to mitigate this problem, we also performed a Fixed Effects (FE) regression procedure (also known as Within Estimator) on the model. The results from the FE procedure are presented in Table 8 .
[insert Table 8 here]
Taking into account the results from OLS and FE regressions presented in Tables 7 and 8 (particularly the results from the Fixed Effects procedures, which are considered more robust),
we observed that, according to our hypotheses:
-Growth perspectives (GROWTH) positively influenced CGI;
-The issuance of Level 2 and 3 ADRs as well as the joining to premium L2 and NM listings at Bovespa relate positively to corporate governance quality;
-Financial leverage is positively associated with the CGI.
On the other hand, we did not find a significant negative relationship between asset tangibility and corporate governance quality, perhaps due to limitations of our proxy, because Brazilian firms usually do not discriminate their R&D expenditures and, therefore, we could not use the ratio of R&D to sales as an alternative indicator.
We also observed a positive association between firm size and the CGI index in all specifications.
Even though we did not have a clear hypothesis about this coefficient's expected sign, our results are attuned to the idea that larger firms may face greater agency costs associated with free cash flow but, at the same time, have more financial resources to implement costly corporate governance practices.
Interesting results also emerged from the ownership structure proxies, for which we did not have We also note a positive influence of Tobin's Q on firm-level corporate governance. This result is in line with the idea that corporate governance is an endogenous variable and that there is a reverse causality mechanism between corporate governance quality and firm performance.
Finally, the indicators for the type of controlling shareholder also presented interesting results.
The shared blockholding control dummy showed a positive association with the CGI, while our family control dummy showed a negative association with corporate governance quality.
Nonetheless, all results above may be sensitive to the specification of the corporate governance present a lower probability of being biased by the firms' ownership structure, the overall result is that we have not yet found a clear relationship between firm-level corporate governance quality and both the WEDGE and VOTE variables.
[insert Regarding the first goal, we were able to draw five main results: (1) overall firm-level corporate governance quality is improving at a slow pace; (2) despite the overall corporate governance improvement, overall firm-level corporate governance quality can still be considered poor; (3) the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices, rather than inciting convergence, seems to increase divergence, leading to greater corporate governance quality heterogeneity among firms throughout the period; (4) divergence about the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices is happening in each one of the four CGI sub-indices as well (board of directors, disclosure, shareholders rights, and ethics); (5) firms appear to fare better on disclosure and worst on shareholders rights. 
Future growth opportunities
Firms with a large number of future growth opportunities should need to raise more external financing. Therefore, these firms would tend to voluntarily adopt better corporate governance (CG) practices in order to facilitate fund raising (KLAPPER and LOVE, 2004) .
GROWTH
Nature of operations (tangibility of assets)
Firms with more intangible assets should have, ceteris paribus, a higher risk of resources diversion (intangible assets are more difficult to observe and monitor). Therefore, firms with a greater proportion of intangible assets should voluntarily adopt better CG practices in compensation (HIMMELBERG et al., 1999 secure the votes of minority shareholders in order to control the direction of the firm. Therefore, Anand et al. (2006, p. 13) hypothesize that large shareholders (controlling more than 50% of voting shares) would be less likely to voluntarily implement recommended governance guidelines, leading to a prediction of a worst firm-level CG. On the other hand, however, higher concentration of control rights could lead firms to voluntarily adopt better CG practices in order to compensate for the grater probability of expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth. Regarding the cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders/managers (1TDIR or 3TDIR, percentage of total shares), there should be a negative relation between cash flow rights and the probability of expropriation of external shareholders and investors. This could lead to a higher firm-level CG as a consequence of a better alignment of interests. However, it also could lead to a lower firm-level CG, since the high percentage of total shares held by controlling shareholders could be seen as a governance mechanism that would reduce the need for the voluntary adoption of better corporate governance practices (improving other CG mechanisms).
Regarding the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights (WEDGE1 or WEDGE3), there should be a positive relation between the wedge of rights and the probability of external investors' expropriation. Therefore, the same rationale for the concentration of voting rights applies (1VDIR or 3VDIR). There should be a positive relation between firm performance and fimr-level CG as a consequence of lower expropriation of minority shareholders and other external investors. Besides, firms with better operational performance could be more willing to be more transparent, resulting in a higher corporate governance rating. Additionally, it's possible that firms with poor performance could voluntarily improve their CG level in order to compensate their weak performance. However, this would be captured by a lagged performance variable (not a contemporary one). ROE Industry Industry can influence firm-level corporate governance. For instance, in more regulated sectors, such as telecommunications, firms could be forced to adopt stricter levels of disclosure.
IND
Type of controlling shareholder(s)
The type of controlling shareholder (state-owned, family-owned, foreign, shared control, etc.) could influence the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices. This percentage was considered as the threshold for control. This information was extracted from the annual CVM filings.
TYPE
17
Is the percentage of non-voting shares in total capital less than 20%?
This information was extracted from the number of shares in the annual CVM filings.
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest
18
Is the ultimate controlling shareholders' ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights greater than 1?
This information was calculated using the procedure described earlier in this paper. Comparison of what is in the corporate charter, if anything, with the legal requirements at the time -80% for voting shares and no tag along for non-voting shares.
22
Are there pyramidal structures that decrease control concentration of the ultimate controlling shareholder?
Annual filings were used to verify if there were indirect control structures and if they reduce control concentration of the ultimate controlling shareholder.
23
Does the company have shareholder agreements that decrease control concentration?
Annual filings were used to verify if there were shareholder agreements and the terms of the agreements to check if they reduce control concentration of the ultimate controlling shareholder.
Shareholder rights
24
Is the free-float greater than or equal to what is required in Bovespa's Level 1 trading segment (25%)?
We verified in the annual CVM filings if the declared free float was greater than 25%.
Each question has a "yes" or "no" answer. If the answer is "yes", then the value of 1 is attributed to the question, otherwise the value is 0. The index is the sum of the points for each question. The maximum index value is 24. Index dimensions are simply for presentation purposes and there is no weighting among questions. All questions are answered using public information disclosed by listed companies and not by means of potentially subjective interviews. Sources of information are company filings, charters, and annual reports, for example, made available by infoinvest.com.br. (1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 
Fixed-Effect regressions
A reduced form of CGI, excluding questions 16, 17, and 18, is the dependent variable (CGI21). These questions were excluded because they're directly related to the concentration of control rights and cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders. The operational definition of all explanatory variables is presented in Table 3 . Binary variables related to the firms' industry (IND) and year (YEAR) were included in the regressions below, being omitted from the tables due to space reasons. The sample is comprised of 823 firm-years observations for the 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Figures between parentheses indicate t statistics. ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The coefficients were estimated through the Fixed-Effect procedures (FE).
Reduced Corporate Governance Practices Index (CGI21)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
